The Limits of International Organisation Leadership? European Crisis Management in the 1980s and the Inherent Tension Between Bilateralism and Collectivism by WINN, Neil
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/29
The Limits of International 
Organisation Leadership?
European Crisis Management 
in the 1980s and the Inherent Tension 
Between Bilateralism and Collectivism


























































































































































































Winn: The Limits of International Organisation Leadership? 
European Crisis Management in the 1980s 
and the Inherent Tension Between 
Bilateralism and Collectivism
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/29
WP




























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council o f  the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of  
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 




























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE  
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE
The Limits of International 
Organisation Leadership?
E u rop ean  C risis M anagem ent in the 1980s 
and the Inherent Tension Betw een  
B ila tera lism  and C ollectiv ism
NEIL W IN N
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/29 




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Neil Winn
Printed in Italy in June 1996 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 






























































































Most accounts of European approaches to crisis management fail to account for 
both bilateral and collective/multilateral dynamics in inter-European policy 
coordination and transatlantic cooperation. The present paper argues that during 
international crisis situations affecting west European interests in the early- to 
mid-1980s relations between the European powers were mainly bilateral in 
nature, but also with collective underpinnings. However, collectivism in policy 
coordination was important in providing the ‘first draft’ material for later 
implemented bilateral decisions. The main empirical and theoretical contribution 
of this essay focuses on the political aspects of policy coordination in 
international organisations and the importance of the inherent tension between 
bilateralism and collectivism in foreign policy formulation. It begins by arguing 
that an inherent tension therefore exists in policy coordination between 
bilateralism and collectivism/multilateralism. This is main subject of this paper. 
To what extent is collective action in international organisation important in 
explaining European approaches to crisis management at the inter-European level 
and at the transatlantic level? What are the limits of international organisation 
leadership in this context? To what extent was leadership necessary to achieve 
European coordination of national foreign policies? To what extent were the 
states of west Europe willing to organise in a collective fashion? European 
Political Cooperation functioned as a back up to the main bilateral channel of 
communication. At the level of transatlantic relations consultations between the 
United States and the European powers were generally bilateral. Ministerial 
meetings in the framework of the Atlantic alliance served as a supplementary 
channel for transatlantic bargaining when bilateralism became bogged down. The 
central purpose of this paper is to cast some light on how the principal states of 
Western Europe attempted to manage international cold war crises in the early-
1 This paper is partially based upon qualitative data obtained through interviews. In total 
40 off-the-record interviews were conducted with foreign ministry officials and diplomats, 
former government ministers, former and current EC/EU officials, academic specialists and 
journalists in Washington, London, Paris and Bonn. The general consensus among the 
interviewees was that bilateralism constituted the single most important form of both inter- 
European and transatlantic cooperation in the three cases. However, it was also emphasised 
again and again that both EPC (for inter-European cooperation) and NATO (for transatlantic 
cooperation) were important for highlighting the then increasing European Community interest 
in speaking with one voice. Even though bilateral channels were used with increasing 
occurrence in the three cases the pressures shaping those bilateral choices were often 
previously formulated according to multilateral pressures drawn from state participation in 



























































































to mid-1980s. In doing so the paper starts with the assumption that it is most 
fruitful to study the actions and motives of the three major powers in Western 
Europe: France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. Leadership in 
European Political Cooperation was the raison d’etat for possible collective 
action in each of the cases studied. Without leadership joint actions were not 
feasible. What motives did the European powers have in reacting to international 
crises in the way they did? What institutions did the European powers decide to 
channel their policies through? What types of actions did each of the European 
powers choose to pursue? To what extent did the European powers perceive it 
in their best interests to act collectively in a leadership role? Main question: 
Wrhat was the tension between bilateralism and collectivism/multilateralism in 
the cases? In the period under scrutiny inter-European relations were decisively 
linked to transatlantic relations. Multilayered diplomacy (meaning possible 
arenas for policy-making) implied that: (1) Relations in Europe between the 
major powers towards a third party crisis could be conducted either unilaterally, 
bilaterally or in European Political Cooperation. As stated above, relations in 
Europe between the major powers were typically bilateral but with 
collective/multiiateral underpinnings. (2) Relations at the transatlantic level could 
be conducted either bilaterally or in the Atlantic alliance. As stated above, 
relations also were typically bilateral but with collective/multiiateral 
underpinnings. The transatlantic dimension must thus form an integral part of 
the analysis.
Questions to be Asked
The present analysis seeks to focus on the Polish crisis 1980-82, the Grenada 
crisis 1983 and the Libya crisis 1986 as case studies of European crisis 
management in the 1980s, with a particular emphasis on the management of 
European-American relations towards the crises. The cases have been chosen in 
that each had implications and spin-offs for leadership in European Political 
Cooperation, for bilateral relations between the European powers and the 
inherent tension between these two: bilateralism and collectivism. Indeed, this 
analysis it is argued has very important implications for the study of degrees of 
collective action - or distinct lack of therein - in international multilateral 
organisations. Poland had diplomatic implications for European power leadership 
in inter-European bilateral and multilateral policy coordination and for Europe’s 
relations with the United States in a period of renewed cold war. Grenada had 
implications for how the "European" policies of the European powers were 
coordinated in a number of international fora. The case also had implications for 
transatlantic relations at the politico-military level. Libya had massive 
implications for a lack of leadership in inter-European policy coordination and 




























































































analysis purposefully focuses on the three principal powers in Europe given that 
it is they who generally drive inter-European and transatlantic policy 
coordination and policy-making. The three episodes dealt with are also excellent 
case studies of leadership in an international organisation.
Account will be taken of: types o f action (unilateral, bilateral and 
collective), the fora  used for the explication of actions (bilateralism, EPC and 
NATO) and the type o f  crisis (international and domestic). The present analysis 
focuses on three traditional types of international crisis involving European 
reactions to the crises and contingent elements in transatlantic relations.
In the European context it is argued that European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) in the three cases served as a "back up" forum for the coordination of 
national foreign policies when bilateral channels failed or became bogged down. 
The ‘big three’ in Western Europe (Britain, France and West Germany) used 
EPC as an extension of national interests. Collective "European" policies (if one 
can term them such) only emerged when the national interests of the ‘big three’ 
were served. Relations with the United States in the above crises were mainly 
bilateral. However, when bilateralism became bogged down alternative 
multilateral arena’s of consultation were used: the main one’s being either 
meetings of NATO foreign ministers (Poland) or informal meetings if the issue 
was out of area for NATO (Grenada and Libya). Additionally, the United States- 
European Political Cooperation "Political Dialogue" was used on several 
occasions as a ‘last resort’ channel for communication between Europe and 
America. Initially, however, it is a necessary task to define types of crisis in the 
context of European and American reactions to the crises.
Framework for Analysis
The analysis will then go on to outline three competing theories of state and 
non-state action in the conduct of foreign policy: neo-realism (state centric), neo­
liberal institutionalism (emphasising the importance of international institutions 
but not disavowing the importance of the state) and leadership by international 
organisation (emphasising multilateralism in relations between states). The 
analysis of the three crises will be guided by the following six questions:
1/. Who takes the lead in responding to the crisis?
21. What type of action is taken (diplomatic, economic or military)?
3/. What is the balance between individual and collective diplomacy? (+)
4/. What are the positions of the British, French and West German governments? 
5/. What is the motive/interest behind national and European-level policies?
6/. How important are the various organisations involved? (+)




























































































Two interests decided the design of the framework. One was an interest in 
determining whether a specific European multilateral approach to crisis 
management could be discerned in the three cases. This seems a highly relevant 
question to ask at a time when European involvement in crisis management is 
increasing rapidly.
The other was an interest in bringing out the feature that is truly unique 
to European Community/Union crisis management, namely the inherent tension 
between the interest held by the key individual members in preserving their 
freedom for manoeuvre and the common interest in acting as one in order to 
strengthen the "Community" (as it then was). The framework therefore focuses 
on the impact international organisation rules (in EPC and NATO), norms and 
ideas have on state policy. My principal sources of inspiration are Keohane and 
Ruggie,2 who have in their writings on international institutions, have advanced 
the thesis that the rules, norms and ideas embedded in international organisations 
play an important role in influencing state interests and hence policy. Even 
though this analysis confirms the conventional wisdom, that the principle 
member states deemed national considerations more important than the 
formulation of a common policy, it nevertheless convincingly demonstrates that 
the then European Community interest in speaking with one voice was present 
and vocal in all three cases. The present analysis also shows that multilateral 
international organisations (EPC and NATO) had a larger impact on the foreign 
policies of Britain, France and Germany than most accounts - either general or 
particular - suggest.
In the present study the author distinguishes between three broad types of 
crisis: interstate (between two or more states), "domestic" with an international 
impact and domestic without a significant international impact. The table below 
shows that the three cases in the present analysis were interstate (between two 
or more states) and military or diplomatic in nature for Europe and the United 
States. For instance, Grenada was military for the United States, but was 
diplomatic for Western Europe. Poland was diplomatic for the United States and 
for Western Europe. Libya was directly military for both Western Europe and 
the United States.
Interstate crises were more common in the Cold War. In the 1990s - in a 
multipolar structure - crises have tended to become more "domestic". Bosnia is 
such a crisis as were Liberia and Rwanda recently (see the table below). Some 
domestic crises have an international impact (such as Liberia) whereas other
2 See Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J. (1989) Power and Interdependence (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2nd ed.); Keohane, R.O. (1990) "Multilateralism: an Agenda for 
Research”, International Organization, Vol.45(4), pp. 731-764. Ruggie, J.G. (1993) 





























































































have little impact (such as the crisis of the state in Western Europe). The table 
suggests that there are nine broad types of sub-crisis in existence. Such a 
classification is necessary to best emphasise that the present analysis focuses 
entirely on interstate crises in the Cold War.
The three case study sections are divided into two main sub-sections: First, 
a chronology of inter-European and transatlantic policy coordination in the 
crises. Second, the main analysis which focuses on types of action (unilateral, 
bilateral and collective) and the fora used for coordination (bilateralism, EPC 
and NATO at the transatlantic level).
TABLE ONE: TYPES OF CRISES AND CRISIS POLICY OUTCOM ES  





























































































































The analysis of collective action has two important dimensions. First, the 
demand for cooperation: how and why do leaders of states decide that 
cooperation is either an acceptable or unacceptable option? On the other hand, 
why do leaders not opt for collective action? Why choose bilateralism over 
collectivism/multilateralism? Second, the organisation of collective action. 
Leadership is often necessary to organise collective action. The analysis seeks 
test the extent to which International Organisation’s can be sources of leadership 
and promote international collective action either against or in conjunction with 
more traditional bilateral diplomacy. What tensions existed between bilateralism 
and collectivism/multilateralism in both Europe and in transatlantic relations in 
the three cases? What was the relationship between bilateralism and 
collectivism/multilateralism. The theoretical analysis is divided into four sub­
sections: neo-realist approaches to collective action in alliances, neoliberal- 
institutionalist approaches to collective action in alliances, leadership by 
international organisation, and a conclusion. Part II of the analysis (the case 
studies) is divided into the three crises. This is further sub-divided into a brief 
chronology of each crisis and then an analysis of the tensions and interactions 
between bilateralism and collectivism/multilateralism in each crisis.
Neo-Realist Approaches
In his path-breaking, and now classic, work Theory o f International Politics, 
Kenneth N. Waltz argued that we can explain international relations when we 
are able to distinguish between system- unit-level factors.1 Waltz has defined 
an international system as the interacting units (states) plus a structure. One of 
the main characteristics of the structure is the distribution of capabilities among 
the Great Powers that make up the system of international politics. Waltz 
therefore distinguishes between bipolar and multipolar systems (consisting of 
only two Great powers, or more than two). Neo-Realists also cling firmly to the 
idea that international politics is basically of an anarchic structure. Under these 
conditions of anarchy, states can only survive when they adapt themselves to 
changing circumstances. In short, Waltz has maintained that the international 
system determines state behaviour by means of, (a) its anarchic structure, and 
(b) its polar structure.
In terms of the formation of alliances, Glenn Snyder asserts that "alliance 
formation is simpler in a bipolar than in a multipolar system. Who allies with 3




























































































whom is much less a matter of choice and more of systemic determination".4 
But, as Snyder maintains, a so-called "alliance security dilemma" will develop. 
This refers to a situation in which one state’s efforts to increase its security in 
a crisis will tend to challenge the security of others. These allied states will in 
turn respond with measures that will increase their own security, which will 
challenge the bases of crisis policy of the first state. This tends to result in a 
spiral of intra-alliance conflict and hostility which will most likely disrupt 
cooperation within the alliance. The "interests" of the individual actors will vary 
according to a number of criteria, including: national political experiences, trade 
interests with the third party in the crisis, and by the degree to which the 
security policies of the alliance partners are coterminous.
From a neo-realist perspective, alliance management would be easier 
under bipolarity since the security dilemma would be largely ameliorated. 
Snyder has argued that when the chips are down, - such as in an international 
crisis situation - each ‘member state’ will have to choose between cooperation 
and ‘abandonment’ of the alliance. But during the Cold War, abandonment was 
extremely unlikely. Within security/defence alliances the Great Power may be 
subject to bargains, balancing and bandwagoning from the smaller members if 
the alliance. This is especially the case in crisis situations, in that the smaller 
states often perceive a greater need to protect perceived security interests.5
NeoLiberal-Institutionalist Approaches
Whereas neo-realists argue that institutions are unable to promote interstate 
collaboration since they "affect the prospects for interstate cooperation only 
marginally",6 scholars such as Robert O. Keohane and Jack Snyder have argued 
the opposite.7 Neo-liberal institutionalist theory accepts the value of systemic 
analysis, but it can be distinguished from neo-realism by its emphasis on the 
effects of international institutions and regimes on state behaviour. Hence the
4 Snyder, G.H. (1990) "Alliance Theory: A Neo-Realist First Cut", Journal o f 
International Affairs, Vol. 44, p. 117.
5 Van Hamm, P. (1993) "The European Community After Hegemony: The Future of 
European Integration in a Multipolar world". International Relations, Vol. 11, p. 458.
6 Grieco, J. (1988) "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Neo-Liberal Institutionalism", International Organization, Vol. 42., p. 488.
7 See, Keohane, R.O. (1989) Power and Interdependence (Boston, Little, Brown). See 
also, Snyder, J. (1993) "New Thinking About the International System", in Snyder, J. and 





























































































system alone does not determine state behaviour: it influences and shapes. 
Nevertheless, it is the main "structuring" element that directly impinges on state 
behaviour.
A well-established body of theory posits that institutions matter for 
international cooperation.8 Ernst Haas has argued that international regimes can 
promote technical consciousness on shared problems. The hypothesis is that if 
actors arrive at a common definition of the problem and a common 
understanding of the causal relations it embodies, they are more likely to 
cooperate on solutions. Thus, through a process of learning, international 
institutions can shape actors’ perceptions of the problems they face.9
Robert Keohane explores another approach to analysing the role of 
international institutions, suggesting that regimes provide information and 
channel behaviours into predictable courses. They do this by creating stable 
expectations about how other actors will behave. Such a setting facilitates the 
striking of further bargains. In short, ‘regimes can also affect state interests, for 
the notion of state interest is itself elastic and largely subjective. Perceptions of 
self-interest depend both on actors’ expectations of the likely prerequisite for 
particular actions and on their fundamental values. Regimes can certainly affect 
expectations and may affect values as well.10
A New Approach: Leadership by International Organisation
It is the present authors argument that under certain circumstances international 
organisations can exercise international leadership, by proposing cooperative 
solutions to shared problems and mobilising coalitions in support of them. Peter 
Haas has focused on "epistemic communities" as a way of accounting for an
8 By ‘cooperation’ 1 mean something more than a class of outcomes in strategic games. 
When actors’ independent choices produce Pareto-optimal outcomes, the result is cooperation 
only in the sense in which game theorists use the term. For my purposes, cooperation in 
international politics requires policy adjustment by each player; it implies that each participant 
follows a course different from what it would have pursued in the absence of a joint effort. 
In this essay, I use the terms cooperation and collective action alternatively. Cooperation, or 
collective action, occurs when a group of actors seeks to provide a good (public or private) 
through agreed-upon joint means.
9 Haas, E. (1990) When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley, Cal, University of California 
Press), p. 9.




























































































active, leadership role for international institutions." My approach begins 
elsewhere, with the problem of organising collective action.
The first step in the argument is to show that leadership is a prerequisite 
for collective action. Mancur Olson has shown that public goods can be supplied 
when one powerful actor values the good sufficiently to provide it for itself (and 
thus for everybody) or to make side payments in order to line up 
contributions.1 2 But as Norman Frohlic, Joe Oppenheimer, and Oran Young 
argue:
"Except in the unusual case of the single individual who supplies a 
collective good, it is generally agreed that some sort of organisation is 
required to collect resources and to supply the good in question. Yet 
discussions of collective goods seldom pay much attention to the process 
through which such an organisation can or will come into existence in a 
social structure".13
They argue that political leadership is necessary to organise cooperation. 
Organising to supply collective goods beyond those of providing the good itself. 
A political leader - or entrepreneur - is one who agrees to bear the cost of 
providing a collective organisation in return for some benefit or net gain.
The dominant mode of thinking in international relations scholarship is has 
been that hegemons play the leadership role because leadership is identified 
with power.14 Hegemons, the argument goes, are able to motivate collective 
action through coercion or side payments. But there are multiple kinds of 
leadership, with power/leadership only one variety; other kinds of leadership do 
not rely on the ability to bribe or compel. As Oran Young has recently argued, 
effective international leadership can also derive from bargaining skill 
(‘entrepreneurial leadership’) and the ability to generate ideas that reshape the 
perspectives of the bargainers (‘intellectual leadership’). Young also notes that
11 Haas, P.M. (1989) "Do Regimes Matter?", International Organisation, 43, Summer.
12 Olson, M. (1965) The Logic o f Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University 
Press).
13 Frohlich, N. et al (1987) Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press), p. 6.
14 See Kindelberger, C.H. (1973) The World In Depression (Berkeley, University of 
California Press); Gilpin, R. (1975) US Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York, 
Basic Books); Krasner, S.D. (1976) "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", 
World Politics, 28, April; Strange, S. (1988) States and Markets: an Introduction to 




























































































the very ‘heavy-handed arguments of the hegemonists’ run into problems of 
reification and ‘do not stand up well to empirical testing’.15 
A number of leadership functions do not depend on the wielding of power. Such 
functions include some or all of the following:
1. Proposing, which points out to potential collaborators the areas in which 
collective action would be mutually beneficial
2. Mobilising, which draws potential collaborators into discussions over the 
proposed collaboration
3. Shaping the agenda, which outlines a framework for negotiations, including 
goals and means of cooperation
4. Building consensus, which promotes common understandings of the problem 
and cause-effect relations
5. Brokering compromises, which defines potential regions of agreement among 
divergent interests.16
If one views the functions of international leadership in this way, then 
clearly the exercise of leadership is not limited to officials of national 
governments. Officials of international organisations are able to provide 
international entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership as defined by Young. 
The officials and staff of an International Organisation (IO) might expect a 
variety of gains from taking a leadership role; enhanced prestige, new domains 
of activity, larger budgets, and more personnel.
The point is that neorealism implicitly assumes for IO’s to exercise 
leadership, they would have to act like major states by displaying 
power/leadership.17 A more nuanced notion of leadership allows that IO’s can 
lead in other ways. By linking political leadership to the costs of organising 
cooperation, I have reframed the notion so that it can include leadership by IO’s. 
In principle, IO’s are capable of assuming at least some of the costs of 
organising cooperation.
I enumerate four conditions under which the potential for leadership is 
greatest. Even the presence of all four in a specific situation, however, does not 
ensure that leadership will be effective.
First, the greater the initial grant of authority to the international 
organisation, the greater its ability to lead in new areas. Some IO’s are forums
15 Young, O. (1991) "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development 
of Institutions in International Society" International Organization 45, Summer.
16 Sandholtz, W. (1992) High-Tech Europe: The Politics o f International Cooperation 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), chap 2.




























































































in which member governments can express their positions and debate the 
differences - like the United Nations General Assembly. Others provide a 
mechanism for coordinating rules and standards; the 10 then promulgates the 
agreed-upon rules. The International Civil Aviation Organisation is an example 
of this type. Other IO’s have secretariats with authority to administer funds and 
programs agreed upon by their member states; the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank are examples. A few IO’s have independent powers to 
make and enforce rules among the member states and their populations. The 
Commission of the European Union is the best example of this type. It possesses 
the power, for example, to rule whether or not to permit certain company 
mergers. Hence, the capacity of an IO to lead depends to a large part on the 
nature of its constitution and the independent authority granted to its officers and 
staff. The World Bank and the Commission of the European Union therefore 
enjoy greater scope for independent initiative than does the International Postal 
Union.
Second, when leaders and staff of the international organisation are 
substantively knowledgeable and well prepared, they can help shape technical 
discussions and agreements. One of the most dramatic examples of this effect 
is the economic analysis generated by Paul Prebisch and his fellow economists 
at the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. ECLA thinking was 
incorporated into the philosophical foundations of both Latin American regional 
organisations and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Third, the capacity of international organisations to exercise initiative 
depends in part on the personal characteristics of their leaders. Personal 
attributes that enhance the influence of an 10 official include, charisma, 
expertise, negotiating ability, personal achievement outside the IO, and 
administrative competence. Thus, as Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson suggest, 
‘High international officials may command information and recognition, which 
allows them the initiative in proposing action or resolving conflict’.18
Fourth, and most important, I submit that IO’s register the greatest impact 
on interstate cooperation during periods of policy adaptation. When national 
leaders confront policy failures that compel them to rethink their objectives 
and/or the means chosen to pursue them, they adapt by searching for alternative 
approaches. Under such circumstances IO’s can seize the initiative to supply new 
models and strategies to promote bargains. Policy crises provide opportunities 
for activist leaders to marshal states behind a cooperative solution, such as in the
18 Cox, R. and Jacobsen, H. (1973) The Anatomy o f Influence (New Haven, Conn, Yale 




























































































framework of European Political Cooperation between the member states of the 
European Union.19
At this point the notion of domestic influences can be integrated with 
notions of international leadership. Essentially, for collective action to be 
possible, governments must come to value it over unilateralism. Domestic groups 
are important in this context: they can provoke governments to rethink and adapt 
their policies, although domestic politics is not the only way to induce policy 
adaptation. Cognitive change is also possible, as governments adopt new ideas, 
models, and information that can alter the way they view problems and define 
the national interest. Governments can also learn from experience, when policy 
failure forces them to search for alternative approaches.20
Summary
Thus the analysis of collective action has two important dimensions. Half 
of the question deals with the demand for cooperation, how and why leaders of 
states decide that cooperation is an unacceptable option. Explaining the demand 
for cooperation forces us to look at domestic politics, learning, and policy 
adaptation. The other half of the analysis focuses on the organising of collective 
action. Even when states reassess their interests, cooperation is by no means 
automatic. Leadership is necessary to organise collective action. IO’s can be 
sources of leadership and promote international collective action. To reaffirm 
what is the balance between individual, bilateral and collective action in the 
three cases? What resulting tensions between bilateral and collective action 
become evident? How important are the various organisations involved?
19 See Nuttall, S.J. (1992) European Political Cooperation (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
20 Odell, J.S. (1991) U.S. International Monetary Policy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton 




























































































II. C ase Studies
The Polish Crisis, 1980-82
European Reactions to the Crisis: A Short Chronology
On 13 February 1980 the Polish authorities - under Premier Gierek - stated that 
they were ready for a ‘wide dialogue’ with the Catholic Church and the 
emerging workers unions.21 This led the Political Committee of the Western 
European Union to set up a committee on the emerging situation in Poland the 
next day. The Committee was asked to present a report on the situation as soon 
as possible. Representatives were despatched to Warsaw, Krakow and Gdansk 
on the morning of the fifteenth. In Poland’s major cities they were to find 
"widespread worker discontent and a general mood of despondency concerning 
worker-party relations in Poland".22 The Italian foreign minister - Emilio 
Colombo, who was on an official visit to Washington - discussed the situation 
in Gdansk with President Carter and his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in the 
White House. The Italian foreign minister informed his American colleagues of 
the worker unrest in Gdansk uncovered by the WEU fact-finding mission.23 On 
19 February the WEU Political Committee issued a warning to the Soviet Union 
related to the situation in Poland. Moscow was requested to "refrain from any 
activity that might jeopardise the territorial integrity of Poland".24
In the months after August 1980 Solidarity had increasingly become a 
national force which had to be taken into account in Polish political life. 
Political Cooperation was slow to respond to this development. Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher took the lead in drawing attention to the implications of the crisis for 
the West, but discussions in EPC went little further than exchanges of views and 
analyses.25 The first concrete action implemented by the Western Europeans 
was to re-schedule the Polish debt on 27 January 1981.26 This was pushed hard 
by the West German foreign minister in a meeting of EC foreign ministers in
21 Agence Europe, 14 February 1980.
22 WEU, Political Committee Documents. 1056, 1980, p. 17.
23 Interviews, Washington, D.C., January 1993.
24 WEU Political Committee Documents, 1057, 1980, p. 4.
25 In the Ministerial Committee of European Political Cooperation. Interviews, London 
and Bonn. January 1994.




























































































Brussels earlier in the month. The French were in principle in favour of a re­
scheduling, "whilst the British with no special interest in Poland were keen to 
go along with the West German lead".27 Previously on 8 January Solidarity 
held its General Meeting in Gdansk. Walesa proclaimed Solidamosc to be an 
"independent trade union free from state control".28 On 16 January the 
Netherlands Presidency of the EC and EPC outlined Dutch priorities in relation 
to Poland: to re-schedule the crippling Polish debt, to aid in any way trade 
unions in Gdansk, and to provide aid for Poland.
Then on 22 January the British made a loan of $50 million to Poland 
based on minimal rates of interest and with a grace period of ten years. The 
"British were following the example of the Reagan administration in proffering 
selective ‘carrots’ to the Polish leadership...That was naive of them."29 30
European-American relations were not in the best shape following the 23 
January natural gas agreement with the Soviet Union that is described below in 
detail. European-American differences also emerged at the end of the month 
when the CPSU Central Committee sent a note to the Polish leadership talking 
of the "indissolubility of the Socialist people’s" /0 American Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig contacted his German, French and British opposite numbers to 
complain - in typical ‘Haigspeak’ - of "gross Western European inaction at a 
time when Poland is in the grips of a tyranny".31 Following the Franco-German 
summit of 5 February Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt issued a joint 
statement condemning the Soviet letter. But the rhetoric of Haig was flatly 
rejected in favour of a cool pragmatism. Further European-American influences 
emerged on the eleventh of February when it was announced that a military man 
would lead a new Polish government of national salvation: the man was the 
minister of defence, General Wojieck Jaruzelski. Washington once again berated 
the European powers for not following the State Department policy of "licensed 
rhetoric".32 The West Germans "were a particular butt of State Department 
jokes concerning the Third Reich’s former links with Poland, and why they had
27 Interviews. London, January 1994.
28 The Solidarity Congress o f 1981, Edited and translated by George Sandford. (London, 
Macmillan), p. 5.
29 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
30 Quoted in Ploss, S. (1986) Moscow and the Polish Crisis (Boulder, Col, Westview 
Press), p. 42.
31 Interviews, Washington, D.C., February 1993.




























































































to make up for past crimes by helping shore to up the Polish regime whatever 
happened...This added a touch of indecency to American policy."33
At the opening of the nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union Brezhnev spoke of the "vanguard of the Socialist people’s. ..and the 
indissolubility of the Socialist motherlands".34 The EC responded by proposing 
to sell more EEC subsidised sugar to Poland. Secretary Haig was furious that the 
Europeans could respond with such a weak gesture in the framework of the 
Community Treaties. Instead he proposed that the Polish debt towards the West 
should be re-scheduled sooner rather than later. In a statement on 25 February 
the European People’s Party of the European Parliament "berated the leaders of 
the European Community member states for doing too little for the Polish 
people".35
In a somewhat contradictory move - contradicting the previous ‘carrot’ 
policy - the agriculture ministers of the EC decided to ban delivery of beef from 
Poland into the Community for fear of disease. This had the effect of widening 
the Polish trade deficit with the Community member states even further. As one 
Commission functionary from the agriculture directorate general recently stated: 
"the institutions of the European Community did not work well together in this 
case...The DG’s of the Commission were also vying for influence on their own 
specific policy sector. At agriculture we could not care less about what the 
people at external relations were doing. There is not much internal 
communication."36 37 The contradictory nature of the American ‘carrot’ and 
‘stick’ policy was being "transferred" to European policy-making except the 
context of the poor decision-making was the foreign ministries of the European 
powers and the directorate generals of the European Commission.
On 16 March the East German Socialist Unity Party and the Polish Party 
of Labour issued a joint statement on the "indissolubility of East German-Polish 
relations". Similar utterances had been made prior to the Russian and East 
German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.j7 This led Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
to visit Poland on 19-20 March for consultations with General Jaruzelski. The 
two talked of the implications of the re-scheduling of the Polish debt for East-
33 Interviews, Washington, D.C., February 1993.
34 Agence Europe, 25 February 1981.
35 Statement issued by the EPP on the Situation in Poland, Press Office of the EPP at the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, 25 February 1981.
36 Interviews, Brussels, July 1991.





























































































West relations in general and for West German-Polish relations in particular. At 
the same time plans for a national strike were being planned in Gdansk. 
Solidarity was on the offensive: Genscher actually criticised Solidarity for 
"‘rocking the boat in Eastern Europe’ and for ‘jeopardising West German 
relations with Moscow and Warsaw.’ He saw the crisis strictly in terms of what 
damage could be done to West German relations with Moscow."38
Following consultations with the British and French governments Herr 
Genscher liaised with Chancellor Schmidt to present a "unified" West German 
policy at the forthcoming Maastricht European Council. The German position 
was that the West Europeans should keep out of the internal Polish situation as 
much as possible in order not to jeopardise hard-won detente with Moscow. The 
final press communique of the European Council meeting stresses that "Polish 
developments should be allowed to occur ordinarily."39 The Heads of 
Government - heavily influenced by Genscher’s report of his short trip to Poland 
- decided not to take concrete actions either against Moscow or Warsaw for the 
sake of detente. The Maastricht declaration was well-received by the 
Government and the Unions in Poland, but not in Washington. Secretary Haig 
was against the general tenor of the declaration because it contradicted American 
policy.
On 1 April the Polish Vice-President Jagelski visited Paris. In talks at the 
Elysee, Giscard "reiterated French concern at the situation in Poland...and 
promised further re-scheduling of the Polish debt. He also confided in Jagelski 
that he believed the Americans were on the wrong tack suggesting sanctions to 
trade and so on".40 At the European Council in Maastricht it had been decided 
to implement "own-resources-aid", that is national and not EC aid, to Poland. 
France demanded that the legal basis be non-EC ‘national aid’ unknown 
reasons. American-European relations received a further blow following a 
Brezhnev visit to Prague, where the Soviet President again reiterated the 
indissolubility of the Socialist people’s and warned those who might wish to 
"repeat the follies of 1956 and 1968”. The Americans almost immediately 
suggested sanctions. The Western Europeans disagreed. Yet a plenary session of 
the European Parliament criticised the European powers for not doing enough 
to help the Polish nation.41
38 Interviews, Bonn, January 1994.
39 European Political Cooperation Documentation, (Bonn, Federal Printer, 1988), p. 144. 
English edition.
40 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.




























































































On the eleventh of April the European Parliament issued a formal warning 
to Moscow on internal interference in Poland and the consequences of a Soviet 
intervention for Soviet-West European relations. The European Commission 
decided that EEC aid to Poland must be dispatched quickly to Poland in order 
to relieve economic hardship in the cities.42 Three days later the US 
government agreed - under intense European pressure - to adjust the debts of the 
Polish State Bank (Handlowy) in dollars. Indeed, "Mr. Genscher breathed fire 
on the telephone to Haig...Haig complied with the adjustment because of its 
logic. It made economic sense to make Poland as dependent on the West as 
much as possible".43 However, the real crunch in American-European relations 
came on the twenty first of the month: Washington decided to end the grain 
embargo mentioned above towards the Soviet Union. Three months earlier the 
Department of Defense had heavily criticised the Europeans in relation to the 
planned Siberian pipeline. That would mean a loss of Western European jobs. 
It now looked to the West Europeans as though Washington wished to protect 
American agricultural jobs. Relations between Europe and America deteriorated 
on this issue to their lowest level yet in the crisis.
At the end of April the WEU Political Committee issued a communique 
that suggested that "Western European interests were not necessarily always the 
same as those of Washington. The Polish crisis has demonstrated this beyond 
doubt".44 This prompted the American Secretary of State to visit Brussels on 
4-6 June to talk with West European NATO ambassadors and with the President 
of the European Commission Gaston Thom. Haig complained of proposed EC 
subsidies on cereals exported to Poland, in that it was unfair competition. The 
collective European reply to Haig was embodied in an EPC ministerial 
declaration of 24 June: "The Community and its member states aim to help the 
Poles by re-scheduling debts, offering aid and subsidising food".45 Washington 
policy-makers - especially Haig - felt heavily let down by the actions of the 
Western Europeans. Haig’s failure to "deliver" the West Europeans also had a 
deleterious effect on his own already precarious standing in the Reagan 
administration.46
By late June the American Department of Agriculture had promised 
American aid to Poland so that Warsaw could buy subsidised com from
42 Interviews, Brussels, July 1991.
43 Interviews, Bonn, January 1994.
44 Proceedings of the WEU, April 1981.
45 EPC Documents, p. 145.




























































































Washington. The West Europeans were wary of American intentions. Was the 
idea invest a little in order to ‘buy o ff the Poles? If so, it was feared "that such 
a strategy would have no prospect of coming to fruition due the Soviet external 
pressure on Warsaw".47 American-European relations hit a new low in early 
July. EEC measures on the modification - increase - of food aid to Poland 
induced panic in Washington: the Americans were afraid that the Soviet Union 
would make the most of Western disunity on Poland by invading. A precedent 
existed in the form of Suez: American-British/French disagreements enabled the 
USSR to invade Hungary almost "undercover". The British, French and West 
German governments dismissed the American fears as alarmist. On 17 July a 
joint EEC-EPC summit of foreign ministers - a first - was convened in London 
to coordinate national economic and political approaches to Poland. This sent 
signals to Washington that "Europe" had its own national-level and Community- 
level policies in both the economic and political fields.48
On 5 August Brezhnev and Honecker issued a joint statement "against 
subversion in the Warsaw Pact". The statement was driven by Erich Honecker’s 
distrust of the Polish leadership and his memory of the 1968 Czechoslovakia 
invasion. Indeed, Honecker had previously accused Brezhnev of being too ‘soft’ 
on ‘class enemies’ in Poland.49 The European powers reacted to the statement 
with utmost caution, whilst the United States accused Moscow of "planning 
international crimes in Poland".50 Two days later the French foreign ministry 
issued a statement offering to supply Poland with more basic food stuffs in a 
period of difficulty. Nevertheless, Western banks rejected further flexibility for 
the Polish external debt for 1981-82: this highlighted the inflexibility and the 
contradictory nature of the "Western" policy towards Poland in that period.
By early September the Polish leadership requested more Western aid in 
order to pay Moscow in hard cash for the Siberian pipeline gas deal. Washington 
balked at the idea of Western creditors paying Poland indirectly to pay Moscow 
for the pipeline. The "Western Europeans not surprisingly disagreed with the 
main thrust of Washington’s logic...The pipeline would, in our view, have 
brought wealth and prosperity to Eastern Europe and thus extended detente".51 
By the twenty fifth of the month, however, the European Commission was 
accusing the Polish of dumping vacuum cleaners in the EC market. This did not
47 Interviews, London, January 1994.
48 Interviews. London, January 1994.
49 Ploss, S. (1986) op. cit., p. 166.
50 The Washington Post, 8 August 1981.




























































































auger well for EC-Polish relations. Further accusations - from the Americans - 
of European inconsistencies emerged on 28 September when the West German 
national press agency accused the Community of meddling in Polish domestic 
affairs: the European powers dismissed the accusation, but the Reagan 
administration argued that "Western Europe has foregone its privilege o f ‘telling’ 
the administration what is and is not correct policy".52
By early October Solidarity had fielded four candidates for the 
forthcoming Polish Presidential elections. Then on the tenth Claude Cheysson 
visited Warsaw. His approach to the visit was low-key. Indeed, "the visit was 
designed to highlight French independence from Western policy-making and also 
that France would do nothing if Poland was invaded".53 This is to be contrasted 
with the American attitude towards the visit: "In the State Department Cheysson 
was not the most popular person. First, because he was French and, secondly, 
because he had gone against the United States policy on Poland in such a 
vicious and public manner".54 The following day Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger stated: "The Europeans should take a firm line with the Russians 
instead of pussy-footing around".55
Meanwhile the Polish government had officially applied to join the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. On 12 November the Italian 
Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini was despatched to Warsaw for talks. He 
was joined by the French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. Both men stated their 
own countries positions regarding the Polish application to join the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. Both governments favoured Poland 
joining, but under certain conditions. "France was in favour of Warsaw being 
limited to how much it might borrow. Italy wished to impose similar stringent 
conditions on Poland".56 Mauroy also took the opportunity to declare that 
"France does not back the sanctions policies of the United States"57 mentioned 
below in Section II. Secretary of State Haig retorted that "France does not know 
where her best interests lie".58 By this critical stage of the crisis American-
52 Secretary of State Alexander Haig quoted in: The Washington Post, 30 September 1981.
53 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
54 Interviews, Washington, D.C., February 1994.
55 Department o f State Bulletin, 30 October 1981, p. 34.
56 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
57 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.




























































































European relations were confused and somewhat mutually "hostile". The Polish 
World Bank application misled policy-makers in London, Paris and Bonn into 
believing that the regime in Warsaw was actually implementing pro-Western 
economic and political policies. There was even talk of a further re-scheduling 
of the Polish debt for 1982. In fact, discussions had already begun on 25 
November.
Then on 5 December the European Commission allocated some 10 million 
ecu’s of economic aid to Poland.59 There was "clearly a belief in Western 
Europe that the ‘carrot’ policy of selective inducements and rewards would 
prevent either a Soviet invasion or an internal repression of Solidarity".60 This 
was confirmed on 10 December when the Soviet Union attempted to openly 
obtain a loan of 500 million American dollars from Western banks. Policy­
makers believed that Moscow and Warsaw had moderated their behaviour in 
favour of the West. These hopes were shattered on the thirteenth when the 
Polish military declared a "state of war" on the Polish people. Western policy 
had failed to fulfil its main aim of preventing an internal crackdown.
Analysis
In the period of the Polish crisis it is a fair assessment to state that relations 
between the three principal European powers were carried out mainly at the 
bilateral level. Nevertheless, EPC (for inter-European relations) and NATO (for 
transatlantic relations) served as "back up" channels to the dominant bilateral 
channel of communication. The pertinent question is why? What does this tell 
us about the tension between bilateralism and collectivism in EPC and in 
NATO? What does this case tell us about potential collaboration between the 
European powers? What does it tell us about the mobilisation of potential 
collaborators into discussions. What does it tell us about how the inter-European 
and transatlantic agenda was organised - either bilaterally or collectively and 
why? What does the case tell us about consensus-building measures between the 
European powers? Lastly, what does the case tell us about the brokering of 
compromises between the European powers and between the European powers 
and the United States?
A number of possible explanatory factors must be brought to bear on the 
question. First, it can be convincingly argued that the United States used 
bilateralism in transatlantic relations as a means to divide and rule the European 
powers. Indeed, American insensitivity towards greater European wants, needs 
and policy platforms was almost official policy in the Reagan administration.
59 EC Bulletin, n°l, 1982, p. 12.




























































































This was in turn exacerbated by a lack of European willingness to go collective 
at critical phases of the crisis. This tells us that the scope for inter-European 
collaboration was attenuated by the United States shaping the European level 
policy agenda externally to some significant degree. Nevertheless, as the 
narrative demonstrates European interests in agriculture, trade and aid were all 
consistently dealt with at the European level via EC Treaty provisions. This 
shows that European level resources were effectively mobilised in order that the 
European powers might go "collective" in this particular policy sector. On the 
other hand, however, bilateralism in transatlantic relations encouraged 
Washington to, for instance, talk to London but not inform either Paris or Bonn. 
In other words, Washington frequently played off the European powers against 
each other with the result of fuelling both greater bilateralism within Europe on 
political issues, but - interestingly - greater collectivity in economic issues 
between the EC( 10).
Second, EPC was a highly underdeveloped mechanism in the early 1980s. 
It was typically used as a "back up" channel when bilateral relations in Europe 
and between individual European national capitals and Washington became 
bogged down. The European powers generally preferred to consult with each 
other bilaterally. It was the perception of decision-makers in all three major 
capitals in Western Europe that the bilateral channel was the most convenient 
for consultation and bargaining. Each of the ‘big three’ in Europe did not want 
to reveal too much information to its immediate European partners. However, 
economic decisions reached in EPC - for instance regarding sanctions against the 
Jaruzelski regime passed in Brussels on 4 January 1982 - were duly given a 
Community wide implementation via the appropriate articles of the Rome 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the political will to propose collective decisions and 
mobilise resources was highly limited until the actual imposition of martial law 
in December 1981. Consensus building measures were seriously lacking between 
the European powers except related to provisions of the Rome Treaty.
Third, Britain, France and West Germany had - and have - extensive 
political, economic and cultural links to East Central Europe. In the Polish case 
the West Germans obviously had many commercial and political interests in 
Poland that were closely related to Poland’s fate. West German policy aimed to 
protect Bonn’s relations with Moscow and (most importantly) with East Berlin. 
The gains of ‘Ostpolitik’ from the early 1970s were the guiding principle in 
West Germany’s policy towards the crisis. Helmut Schmidt’s policy was one 
tacit acceptance of events in Poland. His Free Democrat foreign minister 
Genscher was also keen to improve relations with Moscow and East Berlin.61 
This served to attenuate political cooperation between the European powers. On




























































































the other hand, however, the will to collectivism in Europe was manifest in 
Berlin "quad" meetings between the four western powers. A lack of European 
acceptance of American demands for sanctions against Poland during late 1981 
and early 1982 induced greater inter-European cooperation and actually more 
consultation with the United States. Washington had to somehow justify its 
hardline policy to the West Europeans. The process of policy coordination - our 
main focus here - was well developed and maturing by late 1981, even before 
the crackdown. The Berlin group meetings indicate that the political will to 
propose collective compromises was present in Europe and that a mobilisation 
of resources was implemented to meet the demands of a collective policy 
agenda.
Fourth, French policy towards the crisis implied a tacit acceptance of 
Europe’s division as laid down at Yalta in 1945. Both Giscard and his Socialist 
successor (from May 1981) talked incessantly about the ills of Soviet infiltration 
into eastern Europe. However, very little was done by way of deeds to back up 
the words. Pierre Hassner put forward the following formula in 1988 to describe 
French policy in the Polish crisis: "the Americans were strong, the Germans did 
little and the French used words".62 In substance French policy was very 
similar West German policy: relations between the two parts of Europe - East 
and West - should be driven by pragmatic considerations. This implied some 
degree of cooperation between the French and German leaders and the respective 
foreign ministries. Indeed several meetings were held in 1981 between officials 
from the respective foreign ministries in order to hammer out a "rational" policy 
towards the Polish crisis based upon humanitarian principles and little direct 
concrete action. In turn cooperation between the Quai d’Orsay with the State 
Department increased in order to patch over existing policy differences 
regarding sanctions policy towards Poland and the USSR. Again this indicates 
that the European powers and the United States were willing to mobilise 
resources to attempt to compromise on policy differences. However, consensus 
building measures were fragile and thus tended to reinforce bilateral discussion.
Fifth, British policy towards Poland was also non-committal. There was 
a general acceptance in London that the Polish crisis was of greater significance 
to Bonn than London. London did not want to get too deeply involved in 
making policy given that the West German government obviously was in 
possession of infinitely superior resources.63 Foreign ministry cooperation 
between lower and higher level officials did periodically occur in order to 
improve the European collective reaction to the American agenda in policy.
62 Hassner, P (1988) "The View From Paris", in Gordon, L (ed) Eroding Empires 
(Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute), p. 55.




























































































However, policy differences between London and Bonn did exist on sanctions. 
On this issue London was consistently more in tune with Washington than with 
her near European partners. Hence this general agreement served to reinforce 
bilateral relations between Reagan and Thatcher personally. Nevertheless, Lord 
Carrington also wanted to positively use the Polish crisis to further British 
influence in the development of EPC at a time when London held the Presidency 
of the Community and EPC (July to December 1981 ).64 Carrington also did not 
accept Margaret Thatcher’s disengagement from the Polish problem: under the 
British Presidency, for example, selective sanctions to trade against Warsaw 
were implemented. London was also instrumental in having Poland’s 
international debt rescheduled in August and December 1981 respectively.65 
Indeed this indicates that a fair degree of inter-European collective cooperation 
did exist between the European powers in EPC.
Sixth, there was no sustained political will on the part of Britain, France 
and West Germany to put forward a "unified" European response to the Polish 
crisis. A Euro-wide "collective" agenda was thus severely lacking: resources 
could thus not be mobilised in order to broker European consensus deals. The 
typical "European" initiatives implemented amounted to selective trade and aid 
packages under the auspices of the EEC Treaty articles 113 and 224. And even 
then such measures typically took many meetings and many months to decide 
upon. However, the significance of such meetings relating to the development 
of the European responses to the Polish crisis is that they signify that when the 
chips were down west Europeans pulled together and fought their comer(s) 
against perceived American bullying.
Seventh, meetings in NATO were also important for the exchange of 
information. Meetings of NATO foreign ministers were convened mainly to 
exchange information only and not to "make" policy. Frank discussions did take 
place on a number of occasions, but not with the same degree of frequency or 
intensity as in the bilateral meetings between Washington and the foreign 
ministers of the European great powers. Indeed, discussions of any importance 
were generally made following bilateral discussions.66 That is not to deny, 
however, that neither EPC (inter-European coordination) or NATO (transatlantic 
coordination) were never used as policy-making fora at critical junctures in the 
development of the crisis when bilateral channels did not work. Indeed, as the
64 Interviews, London, January 1994.
65 See: Cynkin, T.C. (1988) Superpower Signaling in the Polish Crisis (London, 
Macmillan), p. 73.





























































































chronology of the crisis intimates many important discussions did take place in 
NATO regarding western tactics towards the crisis and the tension between 
bilateralism and collectivism was greater than most commentators allow in their 
analyses. The Atlantic policy agenda was to a significant degree shaped by 
collective European and American proposals that were backed by resources. 
Nevertheless, many failed to be implemented due to the inherent differences in 
national foreign policies detailed above.
This having been said, however, why was EPC in particular used as a 
"back up" significant channel in west European-American relations? First, EPC 
was used as a consultation mechanism and not a bargaining channel between 
London, Paris and Bonn. Policy was never "made" in EPC. However, this 
confirms the fact that inter-European collectivism existed alongside bilateralism. 
It also confirms that resources were periodically mobilised to further selected 
collective decisions and that the European policy agenda was not strictly bilateral 
- inherent tensions periodically emerged between bilateralism and collectivism. 
Nevertheless, "European" policy, such as on sanctions or aid was more often 
than not decided in bilateral or trilateral discussions between the three main 
European powers. EPC meetings of foreign ministers were used either to clarify 
inconsistencies or doubts arising from bilateral meetings of foreign ministers. 
This indicated that compromises that diverged considerably from the European­
wide decisions reached at the European level had to be watered down to suit 
various national interests.
Second, EPC was always of secondary importance to Washington. The 
American policy of ‘divide and rule’ (mentioned above) towards the European 
powers also had a decisive impact on the importance the Europeans themselves 
did or did not attach to EPC. Indeed, the Europeans tended to prefer the more 
straight-forward bilateral dealings among themselves and in relations with 
Washington. There was no political will on the part of the European powers to 
use EPC as anything other than a crude consultation mechanism. As mentioned 
above, EPC was used as a "back up" channel to the main bilateral avenue of 
consultation. National interests - particularly Bonn’s - had a deleterious effect 
on the prospects for European foreign policy coordination. Resources were often 
not mobilised. The policy agenda was often kept bilateral and hence the 
opportunities to go collective - in a numerical sense - simply did not exist most 
of the time.
Third, existing bilateral channels of communication in Europe and 
transatlantically functioned well and were tried and tested. To some extent this 
in itself influenced the European powers that it simply was not worth to go 
collective on many issues of perceived vital national importance. Political 
Cooperation was still in its ‘growing’ stage in the early 1980s, and hence was 
not considered by its member states to be the optimal arena for consultation. It 




























































































However, the mechanism was an important channel for inter-European 
communication. So-called bilateral "polices" were thus shaped to some degree 
by multilateral determinants.
In the period of the Polish crisis NATO emerged as a significant if 
slightly subordinate arena (to bilateralism) for transatlantic relations. But the 
question is why? First, NATO provided a highly convenient forum for the 
multilateral discussion of foreign policy problems as they arose. It is the premier 
multilateral diplomatic arena for the discussion of foreign and defence policy 
problems in the North Atlantic area. In the Polish crisis meetings of foreign 
ministers supplemented the dominant bilateral meetings. In NATO discussions 
typically focused on European and American sanctions, aid and trade policies 
towards Poland and the USSR. This tells us that the Europeans accepted the 
Atlantic Alliance as an increasingly political, security and economic 
organisation. It was an important institution for policy consultation at various 
times in the crisis: when it was in the interest of the Americans and the 
Europeans to collectivise the Atlantic policy coordination process this was done. 
However, American insistence on implementing sanctions against Moscow and 
Warsaw was not accepted in London, Paris or Bonn.67
Second, the Polish crisis involved making Western calculations regarding 
Soviet military intentions towards Poland. Hence on the military aspects of the 
crisis a certain degree of collectivism did emerge in 1981 and 1982 in the 
Atlantic Alliance. Discussions in NATO frequently focused on the subject of 
Soviet military intentions towards Poland. A number of meetings of foreign 
ministers - and occasional meetings of defence ministers - were called in the 
course of 1981. The aim of the meetings was to prepare (western) contingency 
plans in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland. The American administration 
was more in favour of heavy penalties against Warsaw and Moscow, whereas 
the European powers did not want to endanger West European detente with 
Moscow.
Third, when bilateral arrangements failed - which was not often - 
Washington attempted to persuade the Europeans of the correctness of American 
policy. This was when collectivism came into its own as a policy coordination 
forum. NATO is the perfect forum for talking to large numbers of countries 
when one wants something specific from all of them. The Atlantic alliance 
served as a "back up" channel to the main bilateral arrangements for transatlantic 
relations. For instance, in April 1981 discussions concerning the "Western" 
response to Soviet troop movements along the Polish-USSR border demanded 
both political and military consultations beyond the scope of bilateralism.68
67 Based on interviews in London Paris and Bonn.





























































































In the context of inter-European relations during the Polish crisis the following 
conclusions are salient in understanding Western Europe’s response. First, 
bilateralism was the dominant form of consultation between the European 
powers during the crisis. Second, consultations in EPC (inter-European) and 
NATO (transatlantic) served as a "back up" channel to the dominant bilateral 
arrangements. However, at critical phases of the crisis the Europeans "went 
collective" in for many different reasons: to present a united front against 
American pressure to accept the concept of linkage; to present an effective set 
of sanctions against the Soviet Union but not against Poland, and to in some 
cases develop the institutional set-up of EPC. Third, transatlantic relations were 
mainly bilateral, with NATO serving as a significant supplementary channel for 
communication when bilateralism became bogged down. The Americans decided 
to go collective in the Atlantic Alliance for several reasons: to influence multiple 
national actors in Europe on the correctness of US sanctions policy; to assert 
perceived American leadership in the Alliance at a time when the Europeans had 
begun to question that very leadership, and to highlight European dependence 
on the United States - politically and economically to a significant degree.
The Grenada Crisis, 1983
European Reactions to the Crisis: A Short Chronology
The Grenada crisis occurred so quickly as to take the European powers by utter 
surprise. No such invasion was envisaged in either London, Paris and Bonn or 
in the EPC Working Group on Central America and the Caribbean.69 To say 
that the invasion came as a shock to the participants is an understatement. In this 
section, therefore, the emphasis is on foreign policy coordination in Western 
Europe in the post-invasion phase of the crisis. This is also when transatlantic 
policy coordination/communications actually occurred.
The first reactions in Western Europe to the situation in Grenada occurred 
on 3 October. A British diplomat put it as follows: "News reached London that
69 "The invasion took us by surprise in the foreign office...We were unprepared because 
the Reagan administration decided not to inform us of their express intention to invade. It 
really was a slap in the face for London, especially following the extensive American support 
during the Falklands campaign of the previous year. 1 personally then was a middle-level 
diplomat attached to European Political Cooperation, where 1 served in the Working Group 
on Central America and the Caribbean. Washington showed no interest in contacting any of 




























































































something was going on in Grenada. We were unconcerned given that the 
eastern Caribbean is of no strategic importance to us. In fact one could say that 
government policy was to have no policy. I remember asking my deputy who 
this Bishop chap was...It turned out that he was a Marxist revolutionary who had 
previously studied philosophy in London. Of course we did nothing to confirm 
or disconfirm reports that Bishop was being challenged by his deputy Bernard 
Coard".70
Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of the Ten were meeting in the forum 
of the European Community. It was decided on the tenth to send aid to Grenada 
to the tune of 1.5 million ecu. This was on top of Lome Convention aid 
payments.71 The European powers aimed to induce ‘reasonable behaviour’ in 
the Marxist regime on Grenada. We may term this to be a ‘carrot’ policy of 
selective inducements in order to attain stability on Grenada. On the twelfth the 
Political Directors of the Ten met in Brussels in order to discuss their monthly 
calendar. "Grenada was low on the list of foreign policy priorities for all except 
Britain".72 The British Political Director - Julian Bullard - told his colleagues 
that Bishop had been toppled from power. This had been confirmed by the 
British High Commissioner in Bridgetown, Barbados - Giles Bullard, the brother 
of Sir Julian. Sir Julian said to his colleagues: "Britain cannot stand by and see 
civil war develop on the island of Grenada. The Prime Minister has ordered the 
frigate HMS Endurance to stand by for a possible evacuation of British subjects 
from Grenada. I shall remain in close contact with the British High 
Commissioner in Bridgetown".73
Then on 14 October the British legation in Bridgetown confirmed that 
Bishop had been overthrown by his deputy Bernard Coard. Coard was known 
to be an orthodox Marxist who had steeped himself in the writings of Marx and 
Engels whilst at University in England in the 1960s. A further meeting of 
Political Directors was called for the afternoon of the fourteenth in Brussels. At 
the meeting the West German Political Director asked Sir Julian Bullard what 
"could be done to avert anarchy in Grenada?". Sir Julian replied that the British 
government did not think intervention was a good idea in the circumstances: it 
was illegal in international law,.and it would be a bloodbath if any outside 
power sent in troops.
70 Interviews, London, January 1994.
71 Agence Europe, 12 October 1983.
72 Interviews, Bonn, January 1994.




























































































Sir Julian then reported the meeting to his foreign minister Sir Geoffrey 
Howe. Howe "agreed with the broad lines of Bullard’s policy...But he also 
suggested that he contact American Secretary of State George Shultz. This he 
did on the morning of the fifteenth. Shultz thanked Sir Geoffrey for his 
concern".74 Immediately following his conversation with Shultz Sir Geoffrey 
telephoned Claude Cheysson in Paris and asked his opinion on the crisis. Howe 
put it on a ‘what shall we do?’ basis. Cheysson replied: "I think we can do very 
little...Neither France or the United Kingdom have the money or self-interest to 
do anything. Of course we must protest against the situation in Grenada in the 
United Nations. But I believe the Americans will do something".75
Meanwhile the West German foreign minister proposed to Sir Geoffrey 
that the Europeans make a collective declaration the developments in Grenada 
in EPC.76 Sir Geoffrey declined to make such a ‘token gesture’ as the problem 
mainly concerned the United Kingdom. West Germany had few interests in the 
Caribbean - except for investments - and therefore had no right, in London’s 
perception - to do anything about Grenada.
By 18 October London knew for certain that Maurice Bishop had been 
slain by the new Coard regime. Bilateral contacts between London and 
Washington should have been frenetic but were not. "Geoffrey Howe spoke to 
George Shultz between 2 and 3 p.m. eastern standard time on the 
eighteenth...The British wanted to know what our plans were in the State 
Department on Grenada. We stone walled saying that we didn’t know enough 
about the situation on the ground. That made no sense to them I’m sure".77 
Indeed, "in the foreign office we knew that the Americans were up to 
something...It was just a question of what. Day after day it was getting more 
difficult to get anything concrete out of the State Department".78
On 20 October an informal meeting of the British, French and West 
German Political Directors took place in Brussels at the Sheraton in Place 
Rogier. On the agenda of the meeting was the situation in Poland and the 
reported death of Maurice Bishop. The latter topic received about ten minutes 
of discussion. The main question asked by the three was will the Americans 
invade? It was correctly thought that Reagan had already ordered an invasion. 
It was decided that the three would keep each other informed - via the
74 Interviews, London, January 1994.
75 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
76 Interviews, Bonn, January 1994.
77 Interviews, Washington, D.C., February 1993.




























































































cooperation of missions in Washington - on what American intentions were in 
relation to the crisis. Nothing concrete could be decided given that none of the 
participants had any concrete information.
As we have previously stated, by the twenty-first Washington had initiated 
a propaganda offensive against Havana and Grenada. Mrs. Thatcher contacted 
President Reagan by telephone "but he was not forthcoming on American 
plans...What could I do? One cannot force information out of an American 
President".79 Sir Geoffrey Howe telephoned Claude Cheysson and Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher between 4 and 5 p.m. London time on the twenty-first. 
Cheysson characteristically "dismissed American meddling in the Western 
hemisphere". Genscher called for an emergency meeting of EC foreign ministers. 
The meeting, as stated above, was held on Vouliagmeni between 22-24 October. 
The Greek foreign minister - Nikos Haralambopoulos - prevented the issue of 
Grenada from entering the agenda of the meeting. This was probably in protest 
against the EC member states reluctance to discuss the Cyprus issue in EPC. 
There could be no collective European "position" on Grenada in those 
circumstances. A telegram was forwarded to Washington "expressing the concern 
of the Ten with the situation in Grenada...and with the lack of American 
consultation with Europe".80 One day later the United States and the member 
states of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States invaded Grenada.
Meanwhile on the twenty-sixth France condemned the US invasion of Grenada 
as an "act of gross indecency". The Federal Republic of Germany also 
unswervingly condemned the invasion as a breach of international law. European 
influence in American policy amounted to nil. Washington had invaded Grenada 
on a strictly unilateral basis without prior consultation. On the afternoon of the 
twenty-sixth Geoffrey Howe contacted Claude Cheysson once again: "We must" 
said Cheysson "condemn the American invasion outright".81 Sir Geoffrey 
replied that "such a public recital could only serve to embarrass Britain".82 
Cheysson, nevertheless, went on to condemn the invasion and lack of prior 
consultation on the morning of the twenty-seventh. European foreign policy 
coordination worked well on the level of consultation, but less well on the level 
of collective action.
Meanwhile on the 30th the European Parliament justified the American-led 
invasion on the grounds of humanitarian intervention: "the European Parliament
79 See: Hugo Young (1989) One o f Us (London, Macmillan), p. 443.
80 Agence Europe, 26 October 1983.
11 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.




























































































sees fit to applaud the actions of the United States of America in Grenada...for 
saving countless lives following the illegal coup of the twelfth".83 This seemed 
to justify the American invasion on the part of Western Europe.84 The British 
and French governments protested against the invasion in the strongest possible 
terms, Mrs. Thatcher herself contacted President Reagan on several occasions 
complaining of lack of consultation and of the folly of invading. Most critically 
on the evening of 24 October Mrs Thatcher sent the following telegraph to 
Ronald Reagan:
"The action will be seen as an intervention by a western country in the internal 
affairs of a small independent nation...1 ask you to consider this in the context 
of our wider East-West relations and of the fact that we will be having in the 
next few days to present our Parliament and people with the siting of cruise 
missiles in this country. I must ask you to think carefully about these points. I 
cannot conceal that I am deeply disturbed about these points. I cannot conceal 
that I am deeply disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my 
advice. I have set it out and hope that even at this late stage you will take it into 
account before events are irrevocable".85
In summary, two issues dominated Western Europe’s reaction to the crisis: 
First, the lack of a perceived need on the part of the European powers to 
coordinate their foreign policies. Second, the fact that European influence in 
American policy was slight at best.
Analysis
During the Grenada crisis consultations between the European powers were 
carried out mainly at the bilateral level, as in the previous case. However, EPC 
served as a "back up" channel to the main bilateral consultations. Indeed 
European level meetings of foreign ministers did take place in European Political 
Cooperation and should not be discounted in assessing the importance of 
collectivism in European policy coordination. In transatlantic relations 
bilateralism was also the norm in consultations between Europe and America. 
Foreign ministers meetings in the framework of the Atlantic alliance served as 
a "back up" channel to the dominant bilateral channels. But were collective 
resources mobilised? Did a European agenda exist? Were compromises brokered 
at the European and Atlantic levels?
83 European Parliament Proceedings, A/83-30/10.
84 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.




























































































As in the previous section a number of possible explanatory factors must 
be brought to bear on the question. First, London’s special interests in the 
eastern Caribbean precluded the Foreign Office from sharing detailed 
information with Paris and Bonn.86 However, at the meeting - mentioned above 
- of EC foreign ministers in Greece held in late October actual cooperation did 
take place. Policy implementation was a different matter, but national foreign 
policies towards the crisis were discussed with some verve. European-wide 
proposals were suggested by the Belgians, Dutch and the Italians. Nothing was 
carried through however. The shaping of the agenda by the Greek government 
put pay to European initiatives. All consensus building measures were dropped 
in order primarily because of Greek mismanagement of the EPC mechanism. 
Additionally, Paris and Bonn had developed their own "national" economic 
policies towards the eastern Caribbean in the early 1980s. This served to 
reinforce bilateralism in inter-European relations.
Second, French policy towards the eastern Caribbean recognised a 
distinction between Francophone speaking areas and Anglophone areas. The 
latter were considered not to be in the French sphere of influence. French policy 
specifically targeted former colonial possessions in order to maintain cultural and 
political links with France. However, in the period of the Grenada crisis the 
French foreign minister Claude Cheysson cultivated a strongly anti-Washington 
policy predicated on the premise that it was wrong for the American 
administration to invade Grenada. This was sharply at odds with the approach 
of London and Bonn.87 Again this served to highlight bilateralism in inter- 
European relations. It also highlighted that European proposals were perceived 
to be somehow ‘second rate’. However, European proposals put forward by the 
likes of Belgium provided to raw material for later decisions on the crisis 
reached in bilateral meetings - the paradox of the tension between bilateralism 
and collectivism.
Third, Political Cooperation was managed in a highly idiosyncratic fashion 
by the incumbent Greek Presidency. For instance, an extraordinary meeting of 
EC foreign ministers (meeting in EPC) was called by France, West Germany 
and the Netherlands under the crisis procedure contained in the London Report 
of 1981 (see above).88 In the course of the meeting no declaration was made 
(as the French had wanted) because of Greek obstructionism. The Grenada crisis 
was placed very low on the agenda of the meeting, even though the main reason 
to call the meeting was to discuss American conduct in Central America and the
86 Interviews, London, January 1994.
87 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.




























































































Caribbean. On the one hand, this highlighted that the majority wanted to actively 
cooperate against the thrust of the American invasion. However, this movement 
was quelled by Greek mismanagement of the EPC mechanisms and procedures. 
This in turn served to reinforce bilateralism in relations between the European 
powers and in transatlantic relations.
Fourth, there was no political will on the part of Britain and West 
Germany to put forward a "unified" European response to the crisis. To do so 
would have embarrassed London both in its relations with Washington and with 
several former British colonies in the eastern Caribbean. London preferred the 
normally "quieter" diplomacy of bilateralism in order to save face. Nevertheless, 
this did not preclude collective consultations in EPC between the west European 
powers. Indeed, resources were mobilised at Vouliagmeni to reach collective 
decisions. The political will was there on the part of the smaller countries to 
reach collective decisions in either the EPC or EC frameworks. In the final 
analysis, however, collective action - as opposed to collective consultations - was 
something different that did not materialise in practice due to the national 
preoccupation of the big three and Greek mismanagement of the mechanisms in 
EPC.
Fifth, Grenada was an out of area action for NATO. However, several 
highly informal meetings of NATO foreign ministers did take place in late 
October 1983. Washington refused to consult with the smaller states in NATO. 
This tended to reinforce bilateralism in relations between Washington and 
London, Paris and Bonn respectively.89 The informal meetings often came to 
little and induced arguments between the European powers about how to treat 
Washington in the immediate aftermath of the action. Nevertheless, collective 
resources were mobilised, collective solutions to problems in Grenada were 
suggested, a Euro-American agenda was instigated and the Americans attempted 
to diffuse the situation by proposing consensus building measures which were 
later rejected by France, Germany and the smaller countries.
That is not to deny, however, that neither EPC or NATO (informally) 
were never effectively used as forums for inter-European and transatlantic 
communications. Political Cooperation, as its name suggests, concerns (and then 
concerned) the intergovernmental coordination of national foreign policies 
between the member states of the EC. As in the Polish case EPC was used as 
a "back up" channel for consultation when bilateral measures in Europe failed 
to bear fruit for the participating states. But the pertinent question is why?
First, EPC was used as a consultation mechanism and not as a bargaining 
channel between the European powers. At no stage of the crisis were critical 
policy decisions decided in foreign ministers meetings connected with the EPC




























































































process. However, collective consultations did exist in a highly systematic way 
and provided to some degree the ‘first draft’ for decisions that were later taken 
at the bilateral level. Multilateral influence on implemented bilateral policies is 
unquestionable and present. Resources were mobilised, a Euro-wide agenda was 
worked out (but never implemented) and consensus building measures at least 
existed between the main European powers. Belgium and Italy were particularly 
vocal adherents of collectivism in EPC and in the fringe meetings of NATO 
foreign ministers.
Second, EPC was always of marginal importance to Washington. The 
American policy of no prior consultation (mentioned above) towards the 
Europeans also had a decisive impact on the importance that the Europeans 
themselves attached to using the EPC process. Indeed, the Europeans typically 
tended to prefer more straight-forward bilateral dealings among themselves and 
with Washington. Nevertheless, collective consultations concerning the perceived 
illegality of the American action were discussed by European foreign ministers 
in late October and early November. This also served to ‘inform’ later bilateral 
decision-making. In Europe the use collective resources, collective mobilisation 
and the creation of a European-wide agenda are important determinants to the 
national foreign policies that were finally implemented by the EC(10) - 
especially the big three in the EC.
Third, there was no sustained political will on the part of the European 
powers to use EPC as anything other than a crude consultation mechanism. On 
the one hand, it was used as a "back up" channel to the main bilateral avenue 
of consultation. National interests - particularly London’s - did not facilitate the 
coordination of national foreign policies in Political Cooperation. On the other 
hand, however, the consultation process in EPC was important in informing 
national policies towards diverse issues such as: the legality/illegality of the 
American action in international law; attitudes towards British and French 
linguistic spheres of influence in the Caribbean and German trade links with the 
region.
In the post-invasion phase of the Grenada crisis NATO was not a 
significant arena for transatlantic consultation given that Grenada was out of 
area. However, several unofficial meetings of NATO foreign ministers did occur 
in late October after the invasion on the 27 and 28 of that month. But the 
pertinent question is why? Why did the American government and the 
governments of Europe decide to go "collective" in unofficial NATO fringe 
meetings after the crisis?
First, the NATO fringe meetings provided a highly convenient unofficial 
multilateral forum for the possible collective discussion of the Grenada crisis. 
American reluctance to discuss the crisis meant that the discussions were often 
of limited value to the Europeans. Legally speaking Grenada was out of area and 




























































































powers in an informal meeting of foreign ministers. However, the main point is 
that the Europeans and the Americans decided to go collective for two reasons. 
For the Americans this was the perfect forum to defend their actions. For the 
Europeans this was the perfect forum to voice their doubts and anger concerning 
the American action. Nevertheless, the American reluctance to give much away 
in turn served to reinforce bilateralism in transatlantic relations.
Second, when bilateralism failed - which was not often the case - the 
Europeans attempted to put their multiple national cases to Washington via the 
unofficial meetings mentioned above.90 The main issue discussed was the 
perceived illegality of the American-led invasion in international law. However, 
the most important diplomatic consultations were held at the bilateral level, with 
the above mentioned unofficial meetings serving as an important back up 
channel to the main bilateral channel of consultation. The Europeans went 
collective in their transatlantic relations to perceptibly achieve more than was 
possible alone. This happened - as is detailed above - again and again in late 
October and early November concerning especially the situation in international 
law.
Conclusion
In the context of inter-European relations during the Grenada crisis the following 
conclusions are salient. First, bilateralism was the dominant form of consultation 
between the European powers. Second, consultations in EPC were inefficient and 
could even be described as poor due to Greek mismanagement of the 
mechanism. Nevertheless, the collective consultations provided the necessary 
first drafting of later implemented bilateral decisions. Indeed, European-level 
proposals were made and taken very seriously by the member states of EPC. The 
Belgian and Italian governments attempted to mobilise EC opinion in order to 
shape the policy agenda in favour of a collective response to the crisis. Third, 
transatlantic relations were mainly bilateral, with unofficial meetings of NATO 
foreign ministers serving as a supplementary channel for consultation when 
bilateralism became bogged down. The commitment to bilateralism at the 
transatlantic level, however, was intellectually underpinned by paralleled 
collective discussions where frank views were exchanged. This also underlines 
the empirical fact - allied to our theoretical framework - that collectivism did 
make a difference in this case: collective resources were mobilised, a European 
agenda was heavily discussed, collectivism in Euro-American decision-making 
was also present at the fringes of the dominant bilateral channels.




























































































The Libya Crisis, 1986
European Reactions to the Crisis: A Short Chronology
Following terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 Italy 
demanded a discussion by the Community foreign ministers to be held in The 
Hague on 27 January 1986. The Twelve issued a statement strongly condemning 
the attacks, but only in very general terms that were unacceptable to the United 
States. Cooperation was to be strengthened in areas including security at airports, 
control of persons entering and circulating in the Community, visa policies and 
the abuse of diplomatic immunity. It was also decided to set up a new Working 
Group on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.91 More significant 
was what the Twelve failed to do, which was to respond to increasing American 
sanctions against Libya, or indeed even to name Libya as being solely 
responsible for acts of international terrorism in Western Europe.
Following the bombing of the La belle discotheque in West Berlin, in 
which several American and European allied servicemen were killed, the Twelve 
held an extraordinary Ministerial Meeting in The Hague on 14 April 1986, 
convened at the request if Spain and Italy using the "crisis procedure" introduced 
in the London Report.92 The Twelve issued a statement, the crucial parts of 
which are:
"[...] 2. The Twelve consider that States clearly implicated in supporting 
terrorism should be induced to renounce such support and to respect the rules 
of international law. They call upon Libya to act accordingly [...]
[...] 8. The Twelve are increasing their cooperation with other states [...]
91 Nuttall, S.J. (1992) European Political Cooperation (Oxford. Clarendon Press), p. 303. 
Mention must also be made of Trevi at this early stage of the analysis. Trevi is the European 
Community Action Programme on Terrorism. The work is supervised by a steering group of 
senior officials from ministries of the interior meeting at approximately six-monthly intervals, 
and is carried out at the operational level by a series of working groups, also meeting twice 
a year. Trevi 1 deals with the exchange of information on terrorist plans and activities. Trevi 
2 exchanges technical information with a view to combating terrorism and the disturbance of 
public order. Trevi 3 deals with internationally organised crime, and was added in 1985 (See: 
Nuttall, pp. 299-300).




























































































[...] 11. In order to enable the achievement of a political solution, avoiding 
further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers, 
the Twelve underline the need for restraint on all sides".93
Paragraph eleven was explosive for European-American relations: it 
implied to Washington that the West Europeans compared American conduct 
with the likes of Libya and Syria. The Twelve had hoped that they had done 
enough to prevent an American strike on Tripoli. The US, in fact, had already 
decided to bomb Libya and the attack was actually taking place as the foreign 
ministers of the European Community met in The Hague. Incidentally, the 
Hague declaration also prescribed for the following measures to be taken against 
Libya: staff of Libyan diplomatic and consular missions were reduced and the 
movements of those who remained were highly restricted, and visa requirements 
were made stricter, but there were no economic sanctions as Washington had 
demanded.
The situation required immediate discussion among the Twelve, and once 
again the "crisis procedure" contained in the London Report of 1981 was 
initiated. At the request of Spain and Greece, the Presidency convened a meeting 
in Paris on 17 April, taking advantage of the foreign ministers’ presence there 
for a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
The tone, set by Herr Genscher, was a desire for European solidarity. No 
statement was issued, but the Twelve reaffirmed their belief in a political 
solution and their desire to avoid any further escalation. On 21 April, meeting 
in the Hague, the foreign ministers decided not to either break off diplomatic 
relations with Libya or to impose economic sanctions: European-American 
relations were in "crisis" as the main international crisis was dying down.
In the early phases of the crisis - from early March to early April - the 
Western Europeans maintained constant contact with the US State Department 
via the "Political Dialogue".94 The State Department used the meetings between 
the Dutch Ambassador to Washington (the Presidency of EPC) in order to gather 
information on Western European reactions to the American threat to use force 
against Libya. The EPC partners - through the Netherlands Presidency - used the 
‘Political Dialogue’ to emphasise: that they did not think force was the solution 
to the problem, that they were prepared to do more to fight state terrorism in
93 European Political Cooperation Documents (Bonn: Federal Printer, 1988) English 
edition, pp. 243-244. Italics in my emphasis. Hereafter cited as EPC Documents, page 
number.




























































































TREVI95 and in the EPC framework, and, that "it was wrong of the State 
Department to single-out Libya as the only state sponsoring terrorism. Others 
existed, Iran and Syria to name but two".96
Second, it was easier for the United States to deal initially with the 
Western Europeans in that American aims were to: construct a common 
"Western" strategy to state terrorism, with a European-level response 
underpinning it. When it was clear that the EPC partners could not agree on a 
common anti-terrorism policy Washington reverted to more traditional bilateral 
contacts.97
Third, the State Department had a real need to exchange intelligence on 
a European-wide level. The "Political Dialogue" with the partners provided some 
limited exchange of information. The British and the West German governments 
were the most open in this respect, whereas the French were predictably loathe 
to share any intelligence information with any other country.98 In return the 
Dutch Presidency received daily briefings from the State Department 
Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism At Large, Mr. "Gerry" Bremmer.99 This 
facilitated a certain amount of intelligence cooperation in both EPC and 
bilaterally between several EPC Member States and the United States.100 
Additionally, as mentioned above, the United States took a considerable interest 
in the activities of Trevi from the late 1970s on. It was more reasonable, from 
an American viewpoint, to expect that effective cooperation against terrorism 
would depend on bilateral and collective cooperation between interior ministries 
in Western Europe and North America. Regular meetings - twice yearly since 
1985 - have occurred between interior ministry officials from both sides of the 
Atlantic in order to coordinate national anti-terrorism policies.
Fourth, the EPC Member States wished to maintain links with the US in 
order to differentiate their own position from that of Washington. The ‘Political 
Dialogue’ conversations highlighted that, the EPC partners - especially France -
95 TREVI: See note 91.
96 Interviews. Paris, January 1994.
97 Interviews, Washington, D.C., January 1993. Also see, Galbraith, E. (1987) Ambassador 
in Paris: The Reagan Years (Washington, D.C., Regnery-Gateway), p. 57.
98 Pardalis, A. (1987) "European Political Cooperation and the United States", Journal o f 
Common Market Studies, p. 288.
99 Interviews, London, January 1994.
100 The United Kingdom and West Germany shared considerable amounts of information 




























































































did not wish to jeopardise the Euro-Arab Dialogue due to a lack of US 
understanding of the situation,101 that the EPC members were more aware of 
explicit linkages in international affairs and less willing to contemplate military 
retaliation against terrorism than was the US, and that the partners favoured 
quiet diplomacy instead. With respect to each of the above points the State 
Department Libyan Desk in the Middle East Bureau disagreed. The partners - 
save the UK - were perceived to be too naive and soft on Libya.102 On 10 
April the State Department cut links with the Dutch Ambassador to Washington 
on the issue of terrorism. At that phase of the crisis bilateral diplomacy was the 
preferred channel of consultation. Ambassador Vernon Walters was dispatched 
to Europe on a strictly bilateral basis on the tenth.
Fifth, the Ad-hoc EPC Working Group on Terrorism103 was in constant 
contact with its State Department counterpart throughout the crisis. It is at this 
level that the real nitty-gritty of US-European relations were hammered out. 
Nevertheless, in a crisis situation the Working Group has little chance of 
influencing the policy decisions of Prime Ministers, Chancellors or Presidents. 
Even the Political Directors in London, Paris and Bonn had extremely limited 
opportunities to influence national leaders in policy formulation in the heat of 
the crisis between 10-16 April.104 The important point to be made, however, 
is that EPC Working Group on Terrorism had considerable contacts with the 
American foreign policy process in the course of March and April 1986. This 
is not to claim that the analyses of the Terrorism Working Group had much 
impact on US policy: But the Middle East experts in the State Department ‘at 
least registered EPC’s existence and the differences of emphasis in European 
anti-terrorism policies’.105
Analysis
In the period of the Libya crisis it is a fair assessment to state that relations 
between the European powers were mainly carried out at the bilateral level. 
However, EPC served as an important "back up" channel to the main bilateral
101 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
102 Interviews, Washington, D.C., February 1993.
103 The working group was set up in December 1985 at the initiative of the British and 
Italian governments following airport bombings in Rome and Vienna. It "usually met in the 
Hague on Thursday mornings under its Dutch Presidency". Interviews, London. Autumn 1993.
104 Interviews, London. Paris and Bonn. January 1994.




























































































bargains between London, Paris and Bonn. Three important collective meetings 
in EPC were held in the week of the bombing and determined to some degree 
the continental European response to the American action. In transatlantic 
relations bilateralism was also the norm in consultations between the European 
powers and Washington - mainly due to the fact that London sided with 
Washington. But the pertinent question is why? What does the present case tell 
us about Europe’s ability and inclination to propose and mobilise collective 
resources in crises? What does the case tell us about the way in which the 
European agenda is shaped? What does the case tell us about building consensus 
between the European actors and the United States?
A number of possible explanatory factors must be brought to bear on the 
question. First, it can be convincingly argued that the United States used 
bilateralism as a means to divide and rule the European powers. As in the Polish 
case Washington, for instance, might theoretically talk to Paris but not inform 
either London or Bonn of the talks. Washington attempted on several occasions 
to ‘play o ff London, Paris and Bonn against each other. On important issues - 
such as London’s decision to allow use of American bases in the United 
Kingdom to stage the attack on Libya - Britain failed to consult with France and 
West Germany. When the important meeting of EC foreign ministers did finally 
occur - on 17 April - London had already decided to go ahead whatever the 
opposition in Europe might be. Collectivism was an important element in 
explaining continental reaction to the bombing, but not for gauging transatlantic 
contacts. The continental European members of the EC proposed European 
solutions to the problem of Libyan state terrorism in the aftermath of the 
December 1985 airport bombings. A mobilisation of resources was accompanied 
by the commitment to discuss the problem in EPC using criteria for "useful" 
agenda items that were collective and European-wide. Consensus-building 
measures were built into this process via compromise and the thrust of threat 
posed by Libyan terrorism on European security. This was especially keenly felt 
by the Mediterranean members of the Community.
Second, EPC was only used as a mechanism for the transmission of 
information between the national foreign ministries of the European powers.106 
Political Cooperation was used as a back up channel to the main bilateral 
channels of communication. However, the analysis must also highlight the 
central importance of collectivism in European policy coordination. Three 
meetings of EC foreign ministers took place in mid-April on 12, 15 and 17, but 
no concrete measures against Libya were implemented. Bilateral channels were 
the most significant in conveying information between the European powers at 
short notice - for reasons of efficiency. However, the main points are that:




























































































collective solutions to the problems of state terrorism were proposed, a European 
agenda was thrashed out at the three foreign ministers meetings in April, 
collective compromises were reached and later formed the basis of a continental 
European - minus the United Kingdom - approach to fighting state terrorism.
Third, the European powers have extensive national political, economic 
and cultural links with North Africa and the Middle East. In the Libyan case 
France, Spain and Italy had special interests to protect (investments, cultural 
links, Europeans living in Libya and so on). Italian fears were confirmed when 
Libya launched a missile attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa on 18 April 
after the American bombings.107 This being said, however, those links in terms 
of trade with Libya, for instance, were carried out via the relevant articles of the 
then Rome Treaty. This was nothing if not collectivism in action.
Fourth, British policy towards the crisis implied an acceptance of 
American counter-terrorist policy towards Libya. This implied labelling Tripoli 
as being the main instigator of international terrorism (something that was not 
accepted in Paris, Bonn or Rome). Number 10 ordered to foreign office not to 
consult with the other European powers.108 When negotiations were attempted 
by the French or the Germans with the British they were normally done at the 
bilateral level.109 This did attenuate the European collectivist approaches 
outlined above. However, this also highlights the inherent tension between those 
states in EPC that preferred the bilateral channel (the United Kingdom) and 
those who preferred a collective channel of communication and a collective 
solution (the rest).
Fifth, however, French policy towards the crisis was confused between 
President Mitterrand and the Gaullist Premier Jacques Chirac (who had day to 
day control of the Quai d’Orsay through his Gaullist foreign minister). 
‘Cohabitation’ implied that relations between Paris and the other European 
powers were carried out in conditions of abnormal administrative circumstances 
in Paris. This in itself reinforced bilateralism between the European powers: 
London and Bonn preferred to speak directly with the Elysee. It also encouraged 
bilateralism in relations between Paris and Washington: the State Department 
generally preferred to deal directly with both the Elysee and Chirac separately.
Sixth, West German policy towards the crisis emphasised a genuine 
multilateral slant through Political Cooperation. Bonn attempted to influence 
London not to allow American use of USAF bases in England, in that Germany
107 See: Guazzone, L. (1993) "The Gulf of Sidra Incident, March 1986", International 
Spectator, June. n° 2.
108 Interviews, London, January 1994.




























































































feared a backlash against its own nationals living in Libya.110 West German 
attempts to influence the British were highly limited. Both the Federal 
Chancellor and his FDP foreign minister were worried about German 
commercial links with the Middle East. All contacts of any importance between 
London and Bonn were, however, bilateral. Nevertheless, the ground work for 
the bilateral discussions was always previously laid in the various multilateral 
fora in west Europe. Bonn’s preferred solution would have been a 
collective/multilateral one had conditions permitted.
That is not to deny, however, that neither EPC or NATO were never used 
as forums for both inter-European and transatlantic consultation. Political 
Cooperation, as its name suggests, never inferred the integration of national 
foreign policies. In the Libyan crisis, as in the Polish and Grenada crises, EPC 
was used as a back up channel for consultation when bilateral arrangements in 
Europe failed to bear sufficient fruit for the European powers. But the pertinent 
question is why? However, was collectivism an important contributor to 
decisions reach bilaterally? Were collective resources either proposed or 
mobilised? Did a European level agenda emerge that was distinct compared to 
the American and British unilateral agenda’s?
First, EPC was used as a consultation mechanism and not as a bargaining 
channel between the European powers. Meetings did take place at critical 
junctures of the crisis, but the main inter-European deals were done 
bilaterally.111 Nevertheless, three critical meetings of EC foreign ministers did 
take place in April 1986 prior to the American attack on the 16th. The meetings 
were used to clarify past inconsistencies or doubts arising from previous 
decisions reached bilaterally. This indicates that - in a post facto sense - 
European-level resources were mobilised, a distinct European policy agenda was 
in existence and consensus building measures were introduced in order to find 
common solutions to common problems. This was greatly facilitated by Italian 
and French leadership in EPC. Additionally, collective consultations between the 
US and west Europe in NATO fringe meetings underlines to the American 
administration that Europe was united on anti-terrorism policy, but that its 
preferences were different to those of Washington.
However, EPC was always of little importance to Washington. The 
American policy of divide and rule (mentioned above) towards the European 
powers also had a decisive impact to some degree on the relative importance the 
Europeans themselves did or did not attach to Political Cooperation. Indeed, the
110 Interviews, Bonn, January 1994.
111 See: Pardalis. A. (1987) "European Political Cooperation and the United States", 




























































































Europeans tended to prefer more straight-forward bilateral dealings both among 
themselves and with Washington.
Second, as was shown in the previous cases, the political will on the part 
of the continental European powers to use EPC was attenuated by the lack of 
resources at the European level to implement a Euro-wide response."2 
Resources were not mobilised to a degree necessary to present a fully effective 
protest against the American bombing. As mentioned above, EPC was used as 
a back up channel to the main bilateral avenue of consultation. The above- 
mentioned national interests of London did not auger well for policy 
coordination in Political Cooperation. Nevertheless, three meetings of EC foreign 
ministers were called in one week during April 1986. This also implies that the 
continental Europeans would have gone even more collective if the British had 
not undermined the very nature of EPC consensus by openly aiding the Reagan 
administration. The will was there to go beyond mere intergovemmentalism.
In April 1986 unofficial meetings of NATO foreign ministers emerged as 
an important if yet subordinate arena to bilateralism for transatlantic bargaining. 
But the pertinent question is why? Why did the European partners decide to ‘go 
collective’? First, informal meetings of foreign ministers from the NATO 
countries provided a highly convenient forum for the multilateral discussion of 
the Libya crisis.12 13 The Americans had failed to put their "atlanticist" policy 
of military retaliation against Libya forcefully enough to Paris, Bonn and Rome 
(Number 10 had already accepted the wisdom of the American attack by early 
April).114 Vernon Walters mission to Europe in early April (mentioned above) 
had failed to convince the European powers - except London - of the correctness 
of American anti-terrorism policy. Europe - excluding the United Kingdom - 
decided to mobilise in collective opposition to the United States bombing. The 
protest was led in part by France, Germany, Italy and Spain. It was backed up 
with an agenda that had been previously agreed in successive meetings of 
European foreign ministers. The agenda held that sanctions were the most 
effective form of punishing those renegade states/groups that support 
international terrorism. This was at odd with the Anglo-American view, but 
served to galvanise the members of the European Community to organise 
collectively as opposed to entirely bilaterally.
112 Interviews, Paris, January 1994.
113 Interviews, London. January 1994.
114 For a full general discussion see: Keukeleire, S. (1994) "The European Community and 
Conflict Management" in, Bauwens, W. and Reychler, L. (eds) The Art o f Conflict Prevention 




























































































Second, and conversely, the Western Europeans put forward their 
objections - via the unofficial meetings and via Walters -towards the then 
possible use of American military force against Libya. Their pleas failed. 
Ambiguity was not present in the consultations. Each country stated its position 
on terrorism without ambiguity. No common ground between the EC (ll) and 
Washington/London could be found. This served to reinforce bilateralism in 
American relations with London, Paris, Bonn, Rome and Madrid. However, as 
stated above, the European reaction was grounded in deep collective policy 
coordination and exchanges of information.
Third, when the Walters mission failed (a mission grounded in multilateral 
coordination) the Americans turned to the unofficial meetings, but the 
substantive differences of interpretation remained. London and Washington then 
ceased contact with Paris, Bonn and Rome on the Libyan issue on the day 
before the bombing (15 April). All contacts of any substance at the transatlantic 
level were bilateral before and after that point. Nevertheless, the Walters mission 
was a recognition of the multilateralism matters thesis by the Americans. Not 
everything could be sorted out by bilateral means.
Conclusions
In the context of inter-European relations during the Libya crisis the following 
conclusions are salient in understanding Europe’s response: First, bilateralism 
was the dominant form of consultation between the European powers during the 
crisis. However, collective responses to the American bombing were also 
fashioned in EPC. This is an important point. Consultations in EPC served as 
a convenient back up channel to the dominant bilateral arrangements. Collective 
resources were mobilised, a Europe-wide agenda was set in contradistinction to 
American wishes and a certain degree of consensus was present in inter- 
European politics on the need to tackle terrorism by economic and not military 
means. Second, transatlantic relations were mainly bilateral, with unofficial 
meetings of NATO foreign ministers serving as a supplementary back up 
channel to the main bilateral arrangements. However, the unofficial meetings are 
important clues to the fact that the crisis induced a mixture of individual, 






























































































Inter European Relations: In the three crises it is a fair conclusion to state that 
relations between the European powers were generally bilateral in nature: each 
of the powers had interests to protect, each did not want to pass on decision­
making sovereignty to smaller powers in West Europe and bilateralism is a tried 
and tested means for quick and efficient communication and bargaining between 
two powers in a crisis management situation. European Political Cooperation 
functioned as a back up to the main bilateral channel of inter-European 
communication. However, to return to our guiding theoretical principles. When 
did national leaders decide to go collective and to what extent did they do so? 
Did the Europeans mobilise collective resources in order to produce collective 
policies? To what extent did the Europeans pursue a collective agenda in 
European institutions? The previous analyses highlight that 
collectivism/multilateralism was important to the European powers in the three 
cases. In the Polish case foreign ministers meetings in NATO were especially 
well organised and a number of important west European initiatives from 
sanctions, to aid to trade were first broached there. European Political 
Cooperation was also important as an inter-European ‘clearing house' for ideas 
and dispositions towards the crisis. Leadership was taken by Federal Germany 
for obvious reasons, but in order to preserve German national interests.
For as William Wallace correctly stated more than a decade ago: "When 
it comes to a crisis, every membef government would like Political Cooperation 
to be more effective, more solid and faster-moving in its defence of vital 
concerns: whether it be Mediterranean instability and relations with Libya..., or 
sanctions against Argentina after the Falklands invasion, for Britain, or the 
European developments in Poland, for Federal Germany. The crisis over, most 
governments again hesitate to make additional commitments to achieve the 
solidarity for which that have called".115 16 The reactive nature of the EPC 
system is well-documented."6 Of course, all foreign policy is reactive to a 
certain extent, but EPC is perhaps less prepared and thus less able to play a role 
in shaping events then foreign policy at the national level. Christopher Hill has
115 Wallace, W. (1983) "Introduction", in, Hill, C. (ed) National Foreign Policies and 
European Political Cooperation (London, Allen/RHA), p. 11.
116 Van Praag, N. (1982) "Conclusions: The Limited Potential for Crisis Management", 
in, Allen, D. and Wessels, W. (eds) European Political Cooperation (London, Butterworths), 
pp. 104-109; Williams, P. (1991) "European Crisis Management", in, George, A.L. (ed) 
Problems o f Crisis Management (Boulder, Col. Westview Press), pp. 500-515; Hill, C. "EPC’s 





























































































correctly described EPC’s performance in crises as "being less than 
satisfactory".117 This served, in the present authors opinion, against effective 
collective action in any of the three crises or in other like crises. Thus, in the 
case Afghanistan the member states hesitated for several days before convening 
a meeting in order to discuss the Soviet invasion of December 1979; in 1980 the 
member states failed to react to Carter administration policy in relation to 
Washington’s boycott of the Moscow Olympics; in 1982 the member states 
failed to get to a collective grips with the Lebanon crisis; in 1983 the member 
states failed to react one way or the other to an American intervention in a third 
world country (Grenada); in 1986 the Europeans failed to come up with a 
feasible alternative to the American policy on terrorism. The list of crisis failures 
in EPC collective action is legion.
In the absence of clearly defined common objectives, when is an issue 
likely to become the object of collective deliberations in EPC? The case studies 
suggest there are two situations where this is likely. The first is where broad 
common interests are at stake or are threatened. This was the case in Poland 
where the Nine/Ten were united for their concerns for the political and economic 
situation in Poland. This was also partially the case in the Libyan crisis given 
that the European powers attempted to fashion a "European" response to the 
American agenda on Libyan terrorism. However, where such general common 
interests are involved it has proved difficult to contain the divergent interests 
that exist beneath them with decisive coordinated manoeuvring, or achieve a 
rather disorganised exercise in collective cost cutting."8 Leadership in 
collective action is often not present as is the demand for collective action. 
These two elements are the key to explaining the move towards bilateralism 
away from collectivism in policy coordination in the three cases.
The second situation where Political Cooperation seems appropriate, and 
more likely to be successful while conditions hold, as was illustrated by the 
Polish crisis and the dilemmas that it posed for European political and economic 
security. Crucial in Poland was the special interests of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Bonn ensured that European initiatives - either by France and Britain 
or in EPC - were low-key to ensure that ordinary Polish people were not 
punished for the acts and omissions of others.119 In this case cooperation 
worked (a) because Bonn took an active leadership role and (b) other states - 
especially France - continually reassessed their interests and organised their
117 Hill (1992) op. cit, p. 101.
118 de Schoutthe, P. (1986) La coopération politique européenne, (Brussels, Editions 
Labor), p. 65.




























































































foreign ministries to be receptive to collective action in both EPC and in NATO. 
There was both leadership and a demand for collective cooperation.
However, once the European powers decide to act collectively one can 
generally discern a diminishing scale of effectiveness. Passive political 
cooperation is one thing, active is another. Beyond mere consultation come joint 
diplomatic demarches. These were seen at their most effective in relation to 
Poland, with both broad appeals and joint ambassadorial demarches in 
Washington, Moscow and Warsaw. Here the Ten especially benefited from 
British behind the scenes diplomacy in late 1981 (Britain held the Community 
Presidency at this time), and from West German contacts with Moscow and 
Warsaw. Whatever its shortcomings one must never underestimate the usefulness 
of traditional diplomacy. What might be called declaration and demarche 
diplomacy has undoubtedly given a concreteness to Europe’s common identity 
in the eyes of third parties, particularly in Washington. This was undoubtedly 
partly the fruit of EPC given its ‘first draft’ qualities.
Transatlantic level consultations: At the level of transatlantic relations between 
the European great powers and the United States consultations tended to be 
bilateral: each of the European powers did not wish to trade in sovereignty for 
a (perceived) fictitious European unity in policy towards the crises; external 
American pressure, as noted above, divided the European powers in each of the 
three crises on their response; and bilateralism is the tried and tested traditional 
means for conducting European-American relations. However, bilateralism was 
always supported by collective moves behind the scenes. Collective European 
proposals were periodically backed up with a mobilisation of collective resources 
in order to achieve policies distinct from those of the United States. For 
instance, unofficial ministerial meetings in the framework of NATO served as 
a supplementary channel for transatlantic bargaining when bilateralism became 
bogged down. This is even more surprising given that both Grenada and Libya 
were out of area for the alliance. However, consultations were of generally 
mediocre quality given the (obvious) reluctance of the United States to cooperate 
with the European partners in the collective sense. Washington was unwilling 
to accept criticism of its policies. Nevertheless, in each of the three cases there 
was collective European leadership in NATO: the Germans took the lead during 
the Polish crisis; the British took the lead in the Grenada crisis and the Dutch 
Presidency of EPC took the lead in the Libyan crisis along with the French and 
Germans. Varying degree of leadership in transatlantic cooperation and demand 
for transatlantic cooperation were present in each of the three crises. Indeed, one 
could argue that a European bloc emerged in NATO meetings (either official or 
fringe meetings of foreign ministers) in each of the crises. The policies were 
periodically built upon European internal compromises and consensus building 
measures. Agenda’s were set accordingly and resources were mobilised in order 
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